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NOTE 
THE EROSION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: 
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT CONTRADICTS THE 
SUPREME COURT ON THE ISSUE OF 
DIVERSITY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The issue of affirmative action in higher education is con-
troversial and of great public interest.1 The Supreme Court 
dealt with the issue in the landmark case of Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke.2 In 1978, the Bakke Court 
held that while the use of racial quotas in University admis-
sions decisions was impermissible, race may be considered as a 
factor in admissions in order to establish classroom diversity.3 
The Court stipulated however, that race may never be the sole 
factor in considering an applicant.4 
In Hopwood et. al. v. State of Texas et. al.,5 the Fifth Cir-
cuit openly criticized and contradicted Bakke.6 Contrary to 
Bakke, the Fifth Circuit held that race may never be used as a 
factor in admissions decisions.7 The Hopwood court declared 
1. Carol Ness, Business Dodging Debate on Prop. 209, S.F. EXAMINER, Sep-
tember 29, 1996, at C-1; Edward W. Lempinen, Protesters, Police Skirmish as 
Duke Debates CCRI, S.F. CHRON., September 26, 1996, at AI.; Edward W. 
Lempinen, Cash Drought in CCRI Camps, S.F. CHRON., October I, 1996, at A17. 
2. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
3. [d. at 314-15. 
4. [d. at 315. 
5. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
6. [d. at 948. 
. 7. [d. at 962. 
459 
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that diversity based on racial factors does not facilitate the 
goals of equal protection.s Consequently, the Fifth Circuit de-
nounced the particular race-based admissions program at is-
sue, as well as all affirmative action plans used for diversity 
purposes in higher education admissions.9 
Hopwood involved four white applicants who applied for 
admission to the University of Texas School of Law (hereinaf-
ter "the Law School") in 1992.10 At that time, the Law School 
had a special affirmative action admissions programll similar 
to that in Bakke. Under this special admissions program, a 
certain percentage of entering class seats were reserved for 
African American and Mexican American applicants.12 
The Law School denied admission to the four white appli-
cants,13 while accepting African American and Mexican Amer-
ican candidates with lower grade point averages and test 
scores under the Law School's special admissions program. 14 
The four white applicants sued the State and the Law School 
for using an affirmative action admissions program.15 The 
plaintiffs' alleged the Law School's affirmative action plan 
subjected them to unconstitutional racial discrimination.16 
In applying strict scrutiny to the race-based admissions 
policy, the district court ruled that the Law School's special 
admissions practice violated the U.S. Constitution.17 The Fifth 
Circuit exceeded the district court's holding by declaring im-
permissible all race-based affirmative action plans used by the 
Law School to establish classroom diversity in higher educa-
tion.ls 
This Comment will begin by examining the facts and pro-
8. [d. at 944. 
9. [d. 
10. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 938. 
11. [d. at 936-37. 
12. [d. at 937. 
13. [d. at 938. 
14. [d. at 937 n.7. 
15. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 938. 
16. [d. at 940. 
17. [d. at 938. 
18. [d. at 962. 
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cedural history of the Hopwood case. It will discuss back-
ground information relevant to understanding affirmative 
action and the precedent used by the Fifth Circuit, most nota-
bly the Bakke decision. This Comment will also examine the 
application of affirmative action in higher education admis-
sions policies. It will evaluate the Fifth Circuit's reasoning for 
contradicting Bakke when the Fifth Circuit concluded that 
racial considerations are impermissible in admission plans in 
higher education.19 Finally, this Comment proposes that the 
Fifth Circuit was hasty in rendering its conclusion. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 1992, Cheryl Hopwood, Douglas Carvell, Kenneth Elliot, 
and David Rogers applied for admission as first year law stu-
.dents to the University of Texas School of Law,20 one of the 
nations top 20 law schools.21 At that time, the Law School's 
affirmative action program reserved approximately 10% of its 
entering class seats for Mexican Americans and 5% for African 
Americans.22 
Due to the large volume of applications received annually 
by the Law School, the school employed a decision-making 
method called the Texas Index number or ''TI.,,23 The admis-
sions committee calculated the TI number using an applicant's 
undergraduate grade point average (GPA) and his or her Law 
School Admissions Test (LSAT) score.24 While not the only 
19. [d. at 947-48. 
20. Hopwood v. Texas,. 78 F.3d 932, 938 (5th Cir. 1996). 
21. [d. at 935. 
22. [d. at 937. The purpose of this program was to increase the enrollment of 
these particular minority groups. "The stated purpose of this lowering of standards 
was to meet an 'aspiration' of admittiIlg a class consisting of 10% Mexican Ameri-
cans and 5% blacks, proportions roughly comparable to the percentages of those 
races graduating from Texas colleges." [d. There was no special admissions pro-
gram given to any other minority group. [d. at 936 n.4. 
23. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935. 
24. [d. The formula was created by the Law School Data Assembly Service 
according to a prediction of success of first year law students. To arrive at an 
ultimate TI, 60% of the weight was given to an applicant's LSAT score and 40% 
was given to the GPA. LSAT scores are calculated using three numbers. The 
range of the score is between 120 and 180, with 120 being the lowest score a test-
taker can receive and 180 being the highest, or the 100th percentile. The formula 
for an applicant with a three number LSAT and GPA was calculated as follows: 
3
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factor used in determining whether to admit an applicant, the 
Law School relied heavily on the TI in the admissions pro-
cess.25 Using the TI, the Law School sorted applicants into 
presumption categories.26 The Law School used three cate-
gories for placing candidates, based on their TI:27 presumptive 
admit, discretionary zone, and presumptive deny.28 
The Law School offered admission to almost all candidates 
in the presumptive admit category and refused admission to al-
most all candidates in the presumptive deny category.29 Appli-
cants falling into the discretionary zone received the most 
thorough review. 30 
As part of the Law School's affirmative action admissions 
program, Mrican Americans and Mexican Americans with 
lower TI scores than non-minorities were placed in the pre-
sumptive admit and discretionary zone categories.31 In addi-
tion, the Law School conducted an application evaluation pro-
cess based on race and maintained segregated waiting lists.32 
Mexican American and Mrican American applications were 
reviewed by a three member subcommittee rather than the 
LSAT (10) (GPA) = TI. [d. at 935 n.l. 
25. [d. at 935. Other factors considered by the Law School included an 
applicant's undergraduate performance, the applicant's undergraduate major, down· 
ward/upward grade trends and grade inflation. The admissions committee also 
looked at the individual applicant's personal perspective and life experiences. Texas 
residents were given significant additional consideration. Therefore, residency also 
played a strong role in an applicant's chance for admission. [d. 
26. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935; Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 563 (W.O. 
Tex. 1994). 
27. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935. 
28. [d. To be presumptively admitted, the TI number for non-minorities was 
199, whereas the TI for African Americans and Mexican Americans was 189. The 
TI too low for acceptance for non-minorities was 192, while the TI number for 
African Americans and Mexican Americans was 179. Therefore, a minority candi-
date with a TI of 189 or above almost certainly was admitted, even though this 
score was 3 points below the TI score a non-minority applicant receives for a Pre-
sumptive Deny. [d. at 936. 
29. [d. at 935-36. 
30. [d. at 936. 
31. Hopwood F.3d at 936-37. As the Hopwood court pointed out, a TI score of 
189 was a presumptive denial of admission for non-minority applicants, whereas 
the same TI score constituted a presumptive admit for African American and Mex-
ican American candidates. [d. at 937. 
32. [d. at 937-38. The school color-coded applications according to race. [d. at 
937. 
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general admissions committee used to evaluate all other appli-
cations.33 In 1992, the three member subcommittee consisted 
of one African American male, a Mexican American male and a 
white male.34 
Hopwood, Carvell, Elliot, and Rogers had respective TI 
scores of 199 (presumptive admit),35 197, 197, and 197 (discre-
tionary zone).36 None received review under the affirmative 
action admissions program.37 The Law School denied admis-
sion to all four of these applicants.38 
These four applicants sued the Law School and the State 
of Texas in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Texas.39 The plaintiffs based their claims on a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution, statutory violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1981, 1983, and Title VI 'of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000d.40 The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declara-
tory relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages.41 
The district court applied strict scrutiny,42 the most ele-
vated standard of review, to the Law School admission policy 
because the policy used race as a primary factor in considering 
applicants.43 Under strict scrutiny review, the district court 
required the state to show that its use of race as a basis for 
admissions furthered a compelling government interest and 
that its admissions policy was the most narrowly tailored 
means of achieving that interest.44 
33. [d. at 937. The decisions of the three member sub-committee were consid-
ered "virtually final." Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 937. 
34. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 560 n.20. 
35. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 938. Cheryl Hopwood was subsequently downgraded 
to the discretionary zone for resident whites because a member of the admissions 





39. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp, at 551. 
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In attempting to meet the standard of strict scrutiny, the 
State of Texas and the Law School claimed that one of the 
primary purposes of the affirmative action admissions program 
was to promote diversity at the Law School.45 The Supreme 
Court in Bakke held this goal to be a compelling governmental 
interest, a fact undisputed by the Hopwood plaintiffs and up-
held by the district court.45 The Law School maintained that 
Mrican Americans and Mexican Americans had been tradition-
ally under-represented at the school and the affirmative action 
admissions program sought to increase minority representation 
in the classroom:? The Law School wanted to provide stu-
dents with a diverse classroom atmosphere to "prepare stu-
dents for real world functioning of the law in our diverse na-
tion."45 Despite recognition of the Bakke holding, plaintiffs 
argued that Supreme Court precedent after Bakke indicates 
that affirmative action programs will only be permissible if the 
program is implemented to remedy the present effects of past 
discrimination.49 Therefore, the plaintiffs alleged, diversity is 
no longer considered a compelling governmental interest. 
The Law School also claimed that Texas had a history of 
discrimination in education. 50 The effects of this discrimina-
tion continued at the Law School, both in the Law School's 
reputation and in the level of education attained by the usual 
minority applicant. 51 Therefore, the Law School argued, the 
affirmative action admissions program also constituted remedi-
al action. 52 
The district court agreed with the Law School and found 
45. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 570. 
46. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); 
Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 570. 
47. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948. 
48. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 570. 
49. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944. 
50. Id. at 948. 
51. Id. At the trial level, the district court found that the evidence presented 
at trial indicates those effects include the law school's lingering reputation in the 
minority community, particularly with prospective students, as a 'white school'; an 
under representation of minorities in the student body; and some perception that 
the law school is a hostile environment for minorities. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 
572. 
52. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 570. 
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that the State of Texas and the University of Texas had a 
history of discrimination against minorities.53 Specifically, the 
district court found that at the primary and secondary school 
levels, minority students in Texas attended academically infe-
rior minority schools compared with schools attended by, and 
comprised of, primarily allwhite students.54 The district court 
recognized that as of May, 1994, over 40 Texas school districts 
were defending desegregation lawsuits. 55 
Additionally, the district court conceded that it was not 
until 1969 that the Texas Constitutional provision mandating 
separate schools for whites and minorities in higher education 
was repealed. 56 The district court further found that this seg-
regation policy resulted in the establishment of higher educa-
tion minority schools that were inferior to those available to 
whites.57 The district court looked to the results of an investi-
gation, held from 1978 to 1980, by the Office for Civil Rights 
(hereinafter "OCR") which revealed that Texas had failed to 
abolish segregation of Mrican Americans and whites in public 
higher education. 58 The OCR investigation also found that 
Hispanics were "significantly underrepresented in state insti-
tutions. "59 
Within the Law School itself, the district court noted that, 
aside from segregation, the most blatant example of discrimi-
nation occurred in Sweatt v. Painter.6o In Sweatt, the Su-
preme Court. held that the State of Texas and the Law School 
violated the Equal Protection clause by denying admission to 
Heman Sweatt, an African American male.61 The Supreme 
Court ordered that Sweatt be admitted to the Law Schoo1.62 
53. [d. at 575. 
54. [d. at 554. 
55. [d. 
56. ld. See also, TEx. CONST. art. VII, §7 (1925, repealed 1969). 
57. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 555. See also Commentary, 'rEx. CONST. art. 
VII, §14 (West 1993). 
58. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 556. 
59. [d. 
60. [d. at 555; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
61. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 636. 
62. [d. Sweatt failed to graduate when he prematurely left the Law School in 
1951 "after being subjected to racial slurs from students and professors, cross 
burning, and tire slashing. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 555. 
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In addition to Sweatt, the district court found that throughout 
the 1950's and 1960's the University of Texas regularly en-
gaged in discriminatory practices against African Americans 
and Mexican Americans.63 
Despite the above findings by the district court, the plain-
tiffs in Hopwood alleged that the State failed to show any 
tangible present effects of past discrimination.64 The plaintiffs 
claimed that the Law School was relying on the occurrences of 
past discrimination in primary and secondary schools, instead 
of particular instances of discrimination within the Law 
Schoo1.65 
The district court held that the Law School violated the 
plaintiffs' rights to Equal Protection under the U.S. Constitu-
tion.66 This was not because the Law School failed to prove a 
compelling governmental interest, however, but because the 
Law School's affirmative action plan was not narrowly tailored 
to achieve true diversity or remedy past discrimination.67 Ac-
cordingly, the district court ordered that the Law School allow 
the plaintiffs to reapply at no cost.68 However, the district 
court did not enjoin the Law School from considering race in 
admissions.69 It awarded the plaintiffs $1.00 in nominal dam-
ages and granted no compensatory or punitive damages.7o 
Both the Law School and the plaintiffs appealed the district 
court decision.71 
63. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 555. Specifically, the trial court noted that Mex-
ican American students were placed in separate on campus residences known as 
"barracks" in addition to being "excluded from membership in most university-
sponsored organizations." Moreover African American students were forbidden from 
living and even visiting white residence halls. [d. 
64. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948. 
65. [d. 
66. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 579. 
67. [d. 
68. [d. at 583. 
69. [d. at 582. The district court did not fmd injunctive relief appropriate since 
the Law School voluntarily changed its special admissions plan by abandoning the 
use of separate admissions committees for whites and minorities. [d.; See also 
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 958. 
70. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 583-85. The plaintiffs requested compensatory 
damages based on their projected earnings as law school graduates. [d. at 583 
n.90. 
71. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 932. 
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On March 18, 1996, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit returned a decision in which the majority reversed in 
part and remanded in part the district court's decision.72 In 
its opinion, the majority examined and openly criticized 
Bakke.73 Although the Law School in Hopwood had articulat-
ed diversity as one of its goals in implementing the affIrmative 
action program, the Fifth Circuit rejected this goal and held, 
contrary to Supreme Court precedent, that diversity can never 
be a compelling governmental interest in a public graduate 
schoo1.74 The Fifth Circuit held that the Law School's admis-
sions practice discriminated in favor of minority applicants and 
had therefore violated the Equal Protection rights of non-mi-
nority applicants.75 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit stated that 
the Law School should be limited to showing evidence of only 
those instances of discrimination occurring within the Law 
School, not at the primary and secondary school levels.76 As a 
result, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs and held 
that the Law School had not suffIciently shown the existence of 
the effects of past discrimination against Mrican Americans 
and Mexican Americans. 77 
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit held that the lower court had 
erred in denying plaintiffs' request for compensatory damages 
because the lower court failed to shift the burden of proof to 
the defendants once the plaintiffs had established a violation of 
their constitutional rights.7s Therefore, the court remanded 
the case to the district court for rehearing on the question of 
damages.79 
The Law School and the plaintiffs appealed the Fifth Cir-
72. Id. at 962. 
73. Id. at 944. 
74. [d. In, the sole concurring opinion, Justice Wiener argued that while he 
agreed with the majority opinion's conclusion in the instant case, he disagreed 
with the court's holding that diversity can never be a compelling governmental in-
terest in higher education. [d. at 962. Justice Wiener stated that if "Bakke is to 
be declared dead, the Supreme Court, not a three judge-panel of a circuit court, 
should make that pronouncement," Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 965. 
75. [d. at 962. 
76. Hopwood 78 F.3d at 953-54. 
77. Id. at 955. 
78. Id. at 956-57. 
79. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962. 
9
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cuit decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied 
certiorari in August of 1996.80 
III. BACKGROUND 
According to the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, all persons shall receive equal protection 
of the law, regardless of race.81 The Equal Protection Clause 
provides two guarantees.82 First, people similarly situated 
must be treated the same.83 Second, people not similarly situ-
ated must be treated differently.84 The Hopwood plaintiffs ar-
gued that because the Law School's secondary admissions 
policy reserved a certain percentage of incoming class seats 
solely for minorities, it denied non-minorities equal protection 
because it treated them differently.85 
A. EQUAL PROTECTION 
The original purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was to ensure that newly freed slaves· 
received equal treatment from state law.86 Throughout its 130 
year history, the Equal Protection Clause has been the subject 
of varying interpretations.87 
80. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd 861 F. Supp. 551 
(W.D. Tex. 1994), cert denied 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996). 
81. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution states in part: "No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
82. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1438 (Foundation Press, 
2d ed. 1988). 
83. [d. 
84. [d. 
85. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 938 (5th Cir. 1996). 
86. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542, 544 (1896). 
87. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); See also, Brown v. Board of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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B. CASE LAw INTERPRETING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
1. Plessy v. Ferguson 
One of the first and most notable cases interpreting the 
scope of the Equal Protection clause occurred in the landmark 
case, Plessy v. Ferguson.88 In Plessy, the Supreme Court held 
that a statute mandating separate train cars for blacks and 
whites did not violate the Equal Protection Clause provided 
that the train cars had equal facilities for both races.89 The 
Plessy Court created the infamous doctrine of "separate but 
equal" in holding that so long as the separate facilities for both 
whites and blacks were equal, they were constitutionally per-
missible.90 The plaintiff in Plessy argued that train cars for 
blacks were substandard to those train cars reserved for 
whites.91 The plaintiff also argued that being forced to ride in 
separate train cars caused psychological injury to blacks be-
cause of the implication that blacks were inferior to whites.92 
The Supreme Court, however, found both races were treated 
equally under the statute.93 The Court stated that any psy-
chological effects suffered by the, black population were not a 
result of the law, but were the result of a choice by blacks to 
feel inferior.94 
2. Brown v. Board of Education 
In reality, after the Supreme Court's decision in Plessy, 
separate facilities for white and blacks were usually far from 
equal.95 The most notable disparity occurred in the school sys-
tems, where schools for blacks were often grossly inferior to 
schools for whites.96 Despite this evident inequality, the Su-
preme Court did not reconsider the constitutionality of the 
separate but equal doctrine in public education until Brown v. 
88. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
89. ld. at 548-51. 
90. ld. at 551. 
91. ld. 
92.ld. 
93. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 537-38, 551-52. 
94. ld. at 551. 
95. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
96. ld. 
11
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Board of Education, fifty-eight years after Plessy.97 
In 1954, due to a changing society, the inherent inequities 
of the separate but equal doctrine, and the importance of edu-
cation,98 the Supreme Court essentially overruled Plessy.99 In 
Brown, the Court held that the separate but equal doctrine 
was unacceptable with regard to public education because it 
denied Mrican Americans the opportunity of a comparable 
non-minority education. loo Therefore, it held the separate but 
equal doctrine violated the Equal Protection Clause. lOl The 
Court added that segregation in education did create notions of 
inferiority among black children and rejected any contrary 
language in Plessy. 102 
The following year in Brown II,103 the Supreme Court de-
clared that the desegregation of the public schools should occur 
"with all deliberate speed,"l04 but the Court failed to articu-
late a specific process for desegregation.l05 Rather, the Court 
allowed the states and local school boards to determine their 
own processes for desegregation. l06 As a result, desegregation 
did not begin to occur until a subsequent series of cases. l07 A 
notable example of the failure to follow the Brown ruling oc-
97. [d. at 491-92. 
98. [d. at 493. 
99. [d. at 495. Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly overrule Plessy 
in its decision, Brown is considered to have effectively overruled Plessy. The Su-
preme Court held "[w]e conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine 
of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently 
unequal." Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
100. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
101. [d. 
102. [d. at 494-95. 
103. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
104. [d. at 30l. 
105. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
106. [d. at 300-01. 
107. See e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 
1968) ("Freedom of Choice" plan struck down as discriminatory); Griffin v. County 
Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (county ordered schools closed rather than comply 
with a desegregation order); Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963) (striking 
down school transfer plan that promoted discrimination as invalid). Many states 
were reluctant to abolish segregation due to the racially hostile environment of the 
time. It was feared and desegregation was known to cause, violent outbursts from 
anti-desegregation groups. See generally Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 
(1955). 
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curred at the University of Texas. lOB 
In 1954, the state of Texas required the maintenance of 
segregated schools. 109 Despite the Brown rulings, this policy 
was not repealed until 1969.110 Moreover, throughout the 
1950's and 1960's the University of Texas consistently engaged 
in discriminatory practices against African American and Mex-
ican American students. III 
In 1968, the Supreme Court in Green v. County School 
Board forced the school boards to comply with Brown and 
ordered the immediate desegregation of schools.l12 The Court 
declared that the time for deliberate speed had passed and 
held that any continued segregation would not be tolerat-
ed.us 
C. THE EVOLUTION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
Several years after Brown and its progeny, universities 
and colleges attempted to remedy past and/or continuing dis-
crimination in the school systems by implementing "affirmative 
action" programs for women and minorities. 114 Affirmative 
action programs were meant to increase and encourage minori-
ty participation in higher education.115 Examples of such pro-
grams have included outreach plans, in which minorities are 
specifically targeted by schools for recruitment, magnet schools 
designed to desegregate school districts, and special math and 
science programs for women and minorities. U6 




112. Green v. County Sch. Bd of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
113. ld. at 438. 
114. GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 751-
819 (Foundation Press, 12th ed. 1991) [hereinafter GUNTHER]. BLACK'S LAw DIC-
TIONARY states these programs are considered "positive steps designed to eliminate 
existing and continuing discrimination, to remedy lingering effects of past discrimi-
nation, and to create systems and procedures to prevent future discrimination. 
These affirmative action plans are commonly based on population percentages of 
minority groups in a particular area." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 38 (6th ed. 1991). 
115. See generally GUNTHER, supra note 114. 
116. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Understanding AffirTTl4tive Action, 23 
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Due to the lasting and very negative effects of continued 
discrimination against minorities, schools and businesses initi-
ated affirmative action plans to help remedy the racial dispari-
ty that discrimination has caused.l17 The Supreme Court has 
generally permitted such programs for diversity purposes 
and/or to remedy past discrimination. us However, the Su-
preme Court has set certain guidelines and constitutional lim-
its on these programs to decrease potential abuse. U9 Such 
limits include subjecting race-based affirmative action pro-
grams to strict scrutiny and prohibiting the use of inflexible 
quotas, since such a practice uses race as the only factor for 
placement. 120 . 
1. Diversity in Education is a Compelling Governmental 
Interest 
The Supreme Court has held that race can be considered a 
factor in school admissions in order to further classroom diver-
sity.121 In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the 
Supreme Court held that racial diversity in public education 
may be a compelling governmental interest, but race may not 
be the only factor used to establish diversity.122 Accordingly, 
the Supreme Court found that the UC-Davis Medical School's 
(hereinafter "Medical School") admissions plan violated the 
U.S. Constitution because the plan used race as the only factor 
in deciding to accept certain applicants. 123 
Analogous to the applicants in Hopwood, the Medical 
HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921, 931-932 (Summer 1996) [hereinafter Oppenheimer]. 
117. Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative 
Action Debate, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1327 (April 1986). 
118. See e.g., Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 
(holding that diversity is a compelling governmental interest); Adarand Construc-
tors Inc. v. Pens, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (holding that remedial action can be a 
compelling governmental interest where strong evidence of past discrimination 
exists). 
119. Oppenheimer, supra note 116, at 935. 
120. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pens, 115 S. Ct 2097 (1996); City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Board of 
Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
121. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-19. 
122. [d. 
123. [d. at 315. 
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School denied Bakke admission on two separate occasions, 
despite a higher undergraduate grade point average and en-
trance exam score than other applicants who were accepted 
under the Medical School's affirmative action admissions poli-
cy.124 At the time Bakke applied, the Medical School used two 
separate admissions standards, one being a regular admissions 
program and the other a "special" admissions program.125 The 
special admissions committee consisted primarily of members 
of minority groupS.126 The purpose of the "special" admissions 
program was to provide applicants from economically or educa-
tionally disadvantaged backgrounds the opportunity to be 
admitted when they otherwise would not because their applica-
tions did not meet traditional academic requirements.127 The 
Medical School reserved 16 of the 100 seats exclusively for 
those applicants accepted under this program.128 Applicants 
checked a box on their applications stating that they wanted 
consideration under the special admissions program.129 The 
Medical School admissions committee did not automatically 
reject prospective students scrutinized under the special ad-
missions program due to a low grade point average, nor did 
they rank them against those applicants in the regular admis-
sions pool. 130 
Although many disadvantaged white applicants requested 
consideration under the special admissions standards, none 
were ever admitted under that program. 131 The admissions 
committee did not consider Bakke under the special admis- . 
siorts program in either year he applied to the Medical School, 
since the admissions committee did not consider him economi-
cally or educationally disadvantaged. 132 
124. ld. at 276-77. 
125. ld. at 272-73. Under the "regular" or standard admissions program, the 
Medical School granted interviews to applicants with grade point averages of 2.5 
or above on a 4.0 scale. Upon completion of the interview, the school awarded the 
applicant an overall score based on the interview ranking, the applicant's grade 
point average, and other considerations. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 273-74. 
126. ld. at 274. 
127. ld. at 272-73. The Medical School conceded that its purpose in formulating 
the plan was to increase minority enrollment. ld. at 280 n.14. 
128. ld. at 289. 
129. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 274. 
130. Id. at 275. 
131. ld. at 276. 
132. ld. When Bakke applied in 1973, four of the special admissions seats re-
15
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Bakke sued UC-Davis Medical School, claiming it excluded 
him from consideration under the special admissions program 
based solely on his race. l33 Furthermore, he claimed that the 
special admissions program violated his constitutional rights 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, as well as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.134 
The Supreme Court held that the special admissions pro-
gram discriminated on the basis of race. l35 Since the Court 
considered race a suspect classification, it analyzed the special 
admissions program using the standard of strict scrutiny. 136 
The Medical School argued four compelling governmental in-
terests to justify the racial classification in its special admis-
sions program: 1) increasing minority representation in medi-
cal schools and in the medical profession; 2) remedying the 
effects of discrimination; 3) increasing the number of practicing 
physicians in under-served communities; and 4) attaining a 
diverse student body.137 
The Supreme Court found that the Medical School's desire . 
to have and maintain a diverse student body was the only 
constitutionally permissible and compelling reason for the 
mained open and even more were open when he again applied in 1974. [d. at 276-
77. 
133. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 277-78. 
134. [d. The Fourteenth Amendment states in part that "[n]o State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.; Title VI of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act states in part that: "No person in the United States shall, on the 
ground of race, color; or national origin, be excluded from. participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or 
activity receiving Federal fmancial assistance." Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act. 
135. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320. 
136. [d. at 289-91. There are three types of scrutiny depending on the classifier. 
The court will use strict scrutiny, the most elevated level of review, for classifiers 
based on race and nationality. Here, the government must show a compelling 
interest in the classifier coupled with the least discriminatory method and narrow-
ly tailored means of accomplishing that interest. Classifiers based on illegitimacy 
and gender will receive a middle level of review, known as intermediate scrutiny. 
Here, the government must demonstrate that the classification is substantially 
related to an important governmental interest. For all other classifiers, the court 
will apply minimal scrutiny. In those instances, the classification must relate to a 
permissible governmental interest, and cannot be arbitrary. See Gunther, supra 
note 114. 
137. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305-06. 
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affirmative action program.13S However, the "fatal flaw"139 
of the Medical School's special admission plan was that it con-
sidered only African Americans, Asians,14O or Hispanics for 
the 16 reserved seats.141 The Court held this was impermissi-
ble because race was the only factor used to decide who would 
obtain placement among those ·16 seats. l42 The Court also 
found objectionable the idea that minority applicants received 
consideration under both the special and regular admissions 
programs,l43 while non-minority applicants received consider-
ation under only the regular admissions. l44 The Court stipu-
lated that it did not reject the consideration of race as a basis 
for establishing diversity.l45 It did hold however, that race 
could not be used as the sole factor for admission. 145 
2. Remedying Past Discrimination 
The Supreme Court has permitted affirmative action pro-
grams to remedy the effects of past discrimination in addition 
to diversity. 147 In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson CO.,t48 
the Court held that remedying past discrimination also consti-
tutes a compelling governmental interest sufficient to support 
an affirmative action plan.149 Consequently, preferences for 
members of ethnic and minority groups are permissible, pro-
vided the government adequately demonstrates the present 
138. [d. at 307-12. 
139. [d. at. 320 
140. [d. at 275-76. It is difficult to see how Asians were underrepresented at 
the Medical School prior and during the adoption of the Medical School's special 
admissions plan. The Medical School admitted several Asians annually through the 
regular admissions procedure. [d. at 276 n.6. 
141. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20. 
142. [d. 
143. [d. In his opinion, Justice Powell states, "No matter how strong their (non-
minority applicants) qualifications, quantitative and extracurricular, including their 
own potential for contribution to educational diversity, they are never afforded the 
chance to compete with applicants from the preferred groups for the special admis-
sions seats. At the same time, the preferred applicants have the opportunity to 
compete for every seat in the class." [d. 
144. [d. at 319. 
145. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318. 
146. [d. 
147. City of Richmond v. JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989). 
148. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
149. [d. at 493-94. 
17
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effects of past discrimination.150 According to the Court, strict 
scrutiny is met when the government shows strong evidence of 
past discrimination151 and a purpose to overcome or remedy 
that particular past discrimination. 152 However, the Court 
specified that the government may not use a race-based plan 
in cases where merely past general or societal discrimination 
has been shown. 153 
3. Strong Basis in Evidence of Past Discrimination 
In order for remedial past discrimination to pass the strict 
scrutiny test, there must be strong evidence of past discrimina-
tion.lM In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,155 the Su-
preme Court stated that while official findings of past discrimi-
nation are not required, strong evidentiary support must be 
present to conclude that remedial action is necessary.l56 In 
Wygant, the Supreme Court struck down a Mississippi school 
board's lay-off policy favoring recently hired black teachers 
over white teachers with seniority.157 The Court held the lay-
offs unconstitutional since the school board had not shown any 
specific prior discrimination against black teachers· which 
would justify such a policy.15s The Court held that the fact 
that society had historically discriminated against African 
Americans was insufficient to show a compelling governmental 
150. [d. at 509. 
151. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (plurality opinion) 
(1986). 
152. Croson, 488 U.S. at. 475. 
153. [d. at 505-06. "To accept Richmond's claim that past societal discrimination 
alone can serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door 
to competing claims for 'remedial relief for every disadvantaged group." [d. 
154. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277. 
155. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
156. [d. at 277. The Jackson, Mississippi school system had a majority of white 
teachers and relatively few black teachers. To remedy this, the Board of Education 
took affirmative steps to raise the number of black teachers. Due to economic 
problems, .teacher lay-offs subsequently became necessary. Accordingly, The Board 
of Education modified their lay-off policy so that the same percentage of black and 
white teachers would be laid off, regardless of seniority. Consequently, white 
teachers who were laid off and who had more seniority than other black teachers 
who were retained, claimed Equal Protection violations. See generally Wygant v. 
Jackson Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
157. [d. at 283-84. 
158. [d. 
18
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interest in the remedy.159 
a. Numerical Set-Asides Permissible 
Like quota systems which establish a definite number of 
spots for minorities/so set-aside programs consist of fixed 
percentages "set aside" for minority placement within an orga-
nization or a school. 161 Although generally disfavored, the Su-
preme Court has indicated that numerical set-asides for minor-
ities would be permitted in cases showing clear evidence of 
past and/or ongoing discrimination against minorities. 162 
In United States v. Paradise/53 the Court upheld a court 
order mandating the State of Al~bama to hire one black state 
trooper for every white state trooper hired. l64 The Supreme 
Court did so based on a judicial fmding that the State demon-
strated past and continuous discrimination against blacks in 
hiring Alabama state troopers. l65 The Court later specified 
that flexible numerical set-asides could be used to remedy past 
discrimination, provided they are used for a limited duration, 
are based on pertinent racial percentages in the relevant popu-
lation, impose relatively light burdens on non-minorities, and 
apply only when no other effective "race-neutral" remedies are 
available. 166 
b. Strict Scrutiny Required 
In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,167 the Supreme 
159. [d. at 276. 
160. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 288-89, p.289 n.26. 
161. City of Richmond v. JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
162. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
163. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987). 
164. [d. at 185-86. 
165. [d. 
166. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Ass'n v. EEOC,. 478 
U.S. 421, 482-83 (1986) (Five-Justice majority upheld court order mandating a 
'hiring goal' of 29% minority membership in a private union that had a history of 
discrimination). 
167. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). 
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Court ruled that courts must apply strict scrutiny whenever 
the government uses race as a basis for its affirmative action 
plans. l68 The majority in Adarand held that application of 
the more permissive intermediate review to governmental 
actions undermined the "basic principle that the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments ... protect persons, not groups. "169 
Under strict scrutiny review, courts must hold the affirma-
tive action program impermissible if: 1) the state fails to show 
that its purpose or interest in the affirmative action program is 
both constitutionally permissible and compelling; 2) its use of 
the classification is necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve 
that purpose;170 and 3) the state's method in protecting its 
interest is the least discriminatory method available.171 Fur-
thermore, the Supreme Court in Adarand explicitly stated that 
a government's affirmative action plan could survive strict 
scrutiny if it is in response to "the lingering effects of racial 
discrimination" against certain minorities, and its race-con-
scious method was narrowly tailored. 172 
N. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Fifth Circuit in Hopwood began its analysis by stating 
that the overriding purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is 
"ultimately to render the issue of race irrelevant in governmen-
tal decision-making"173 and eliminate governmentally man-
dated discrimination.174 The Fifth Circuit in Hopwood held 
that any program employing racial classifications was subject 
to strict scrutiny to "smoke out"175 improper racial consider-
ations by ensuring that governmental interest is great enough 
168. Id. at 2113. In doing so, the Court overruled Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. 
FCC, which held that the appropriate level of review in these instances was inter-
mediate scrutiny. The Supreme Court explained that Metro had significantly de-
parted from the continuing trend of using strict scrutiny to review affirmative ac-
tion plans. Id. at 2112-13. 
169. Id. at 2112-13. 
170. Id. at 2117. 
171. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). 
172. Id. at 2117-18. 
173. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 939-940 (5th Cir. 1996). 
174. Id. at 939-40. 
175. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). 
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to warrant· this highly suspect classification.176 Additionally, 
the use of strict scrutiny requires that the means chosen is 
narrowly tailored to a compelling state goal so that little or no 
possibility remains that the motive for the racial classification 
is impermissible. 177 The court pointed out that arguments 
conferring benefits on individuals based solely on race or eth-
nicity had been consistently rejected by the Supreme 
COurt. 17S 
A. MAJORITY 
1. No Compelling Governmental Interest 
The majority opinion in Hopwood held that the govern-
ment may never consider race as a factor in college admissions 
decisions because that violates the Equal Protection 
Clause.179 The court further held diversity is never a compel-
ling governmental interest,lS0 and, therefore, does not survive 
the standard of strict scrutiny in college affirmative action 
admissions programs. 181 
The Fifth Circuit found that the Law School had an inter-
est identical to that held permissible and compelling in 
Bakke,ls2 but stated that the Supreme Court has never reaf-
firmed diversity as a compelling governmental interest since 
Bakke. l83 In addition, the Hopwood court found Bakke incon-
clusive in determining whether racial considerations are con-
stitutional in school admissions programs because six Justices 
in Bakke filed separate opinions. l84 The Bakke Court did not 
reach a consensus on a justification for its decision, and only 
Justice Powell had articulated that diversity was a compelling 
176. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 940. 
177. [d. 
178. [d. at 941. 
179. [d. at 944, 948. 
180. [d. at 948. . 
181. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948. 
182. [d. at 943. The Hopwood court noted that because the Law School argued 
one of the purposes of the afimnative action program was to promote classroom 
diversity, it had invoked a countervailing constitutional interest to that expressed 
in Bakke. [d. 
183. [d. at 944. 
184. [d. 
21
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governmental interest. 185 
The Fifth Circuit stated that Justice Powell's holding in 
Bakke was not a m~ority opinion and never fully embraced by 
the m~ority of the COurt.186 In fact, the Hopwood court point-
ed out, even the four dissenting Justices in Bakke who would 
have upheld the Medical School's admissions program under 
intermediate scrutiny rejected Justice Powell's position that 
diversity is a compelling governmental interest.1S7 The 
Hopwood majority also stated that later Supreme Court deci-
sions held state interests that are not remedial will never 
justify racial preferences in higher education.186 The m~ority 
in Hopwood further commented that recent Supreme Court 
precedent indicates that diversity will not satisfy strict scruti-
ny.l89 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit noted that diversity takes 
many forms and that racial considerations do not necessarily 
create classroom diversity.l90 Accordingly, the m~ority in 
Hopwood held that diversity, the goal enunciated by the Law 
School and upheld in Bakke, is not a compelling governmental 
interest. 191 
a. Race Based Preferences Exacerbate the Goals of Equal 
Protection 
The Hopwood m~ority ultimately held that racial consid-
erations for diversity purposes in higher education actually 
contradict the goals of equal protection.l92 In advancing the 
argument elaborated in Croson, the m~ority concluded that 
preferences based on race exacerbate rather than facilitate the 
goals of equal protection by treating minorities as a group and 
not as individuals. 193 





190. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 947, 933 n.3. 
191. [d. at 948. 
192. [d. at 945, 947-48; See also Croson, 488 U.S. at 493. 
193. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945. 
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b. Remedy to Past Discrimination 
The Fifth Circuit next turned to the district court's finding. 
that the Law School's affirmative action plan was remedi-
al. 194 Contrary to the district court, the Fifth Circuit held 
that the Law School had not demonstrated a sufficient compel-
ling state interest in remedying the present effects of past 
discrimination.195 Relying on Wygant and Croson, the Fifth 
Circuit held that in order to implement a remedial program 
based on race, strong evidence must indicate that the remedial 
action was necessary.l96 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that 
affirmative action plans based on race could be used to remedy 
the effects of past discrimination. 197 The Hopwood court also 
recognized however, that the Supreme Court explicitly rejected 
broad state programs adopted to remedy general societal dis-
crimination, the only type of discrimination the Fifth Circuit 
determined the Law School had demonstrated. 198 
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit held that a state institu-
tion of higher learning may not remedy the past effects of 
discrimination occurring at primary and secondary schools. 199 
The court ruled that the district court erred in holding that the 
Law School had sufficiently proven past discrimination by 
demonstrating the occurrence of discrimination· at the primary 
and secondary levels of education.2°O The Fifth Circuit .stated 
that such a relationship is too remote and goes "beyond any 
194. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 573 (W.D. Tex. 1994). 
195. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 955. 
196. Id. at 948-49. 
197. Id. at 949. 
198. Id. at 949-50. 
199. Id. at 953-54. 
200. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 954. The m~ority 8tated that while the law school 
did engage in prior discrimination against blacks, "any other discrimination by the 
law school ended in the 1960's". Id. at 953. "By the late 1960's, the school had 
implemented its flrBt program designed to recruit minorities, and it now engages 
in an extensive minority recruiting program that includes a significant amount of 
scholarship money. The vast m~ority of the faculty, staff, and students at the law 
school had absolutely nothing to do with any discrimination that the law school 
practiced in the past. In such a case, one cannot conclude that a hostile environ-
ment is the present effect of past discrimination." Id. 
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reasonable limits. "201 The majority explained that in Croson 
the Supreme Court specifically rejected remedial measures 
such as those utilized by the Law School, holding that claims 
of discrimination in primary and secondary schools were 
"amorphous"202 and without merit.203 Therefore, the Fifth 
Circuit held that the Law School could not use race as a factor 
to eliminate any present effects of prior discrimination by per-
sons other than the Law Schoo1.204 
c. Poor Reputation in the Minority Community and Hostile 
Environment 
The Fifth Circuit also ruled that the Law School could not 
take race into account in order to alter its poor reputation in 
the minority community.205 Due to its unfavorable history of 
discrimination, the Law School claimed, and the district court 
agreed, it had a poor reputation among minorities and was 
viewed as a "white institution. "206 As a result, the Law School 
had a difficult time attracting and recruiting qualified and/or 
exceptional minorities to the Law Schoo1.207 The district court 
found that recent incidents at the Law School such as those 
occurring in Sweatt, contributed to the perception of a hostile 
environment to minorities.208 Therefore, without affinnative 
action programs, the Law School would have an extremely low 
minority student body.209 The Fifth Circuit rejected these 
findings and noted that minority students who benefited from 
the Law School's racial preferences had already made the deci-
sion to apply, regardless of the Law School's reputation.210 
Moreover, while knowledge that a minority applicant will re-
ceive special consideration may make a minority more likely to 
apply, this inducement in itself does not change an alleged hos-
201. [d. at 951. 
202. Croson, 488 U.S. at 499. 
203. [d. at 950. 
204. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 954 n.46. 
205. [d. at 953. 
206. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 572. 
207. [d. 
208. [d. 
209. [d. at 573 n.66. 
210. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 953. 
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tile environment.211 Consequently, the Fifth Circuit held that 
the Law School could not use race as a factor in order to allevi-
ate the Law School's flawed reputation or to combat the per-
ceived effects of a hostile environment among minorities.212 
2. Insufficient Narrow Tailoring to Achieve a Compelling In-
terest 
To satisfy strict scrutiny, the government must demon-
strate that the method used to achieve its compelling interest 
is narrowly tailored.213 Because the Fifth Circuit determined 
that diversity is never a compelling governmental interest and 
that the Law School failed to show any lingering effects of past 
discrimination, the coUrt found it unnecessary to address 
whether the Law School's admissions program was narrowly 
tailored to fit the impermissible interest.214 
3. Violation Not Harmless 
The Fifth Circuit held that because the Law School admis-
sions program did not survive strict scrutiny, the Law School 
violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.215 In order for the 
plaintiffs to collect monetary damages, they needed to show 
injury as a result of the constitutional violation.216 However, 
the Fifth Circuit declared that once the plaintiffs established a 
constitutional violation, the burden shifted to the Law School 
to show that they would not have been accepted absent the 
affirmative action admissions program.217 
The Fifth Circuit found that the district court failed to 
shift the burden to the defendant to prove the plaintiffs had 
211. [d. 
212. [d. 
213. See supra note 44; See also Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 938. (for a brief discus-
sion of strict scrutiny). 
214. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 955. 
215. [d. at 962. 
216. [d. at 956. 
217. [d. at 955-57. See Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd of Educ. v. Doyle, 
429 U.S. 274 (1977) and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (Fifth Circuit in Hopwood relying on Mount Healthy 
and Arlington Heights for analysis regarding shifting of burden). 
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not suffered any harm.218 If the Law School could show that 
the plaintiffs would not have been accepted absent the second-
ary admissions program, the violation would be held harmless 
and the plaintiffs would not collect compensatory damages.219 
However, because the Law School's use of race violated 
plaintiffs constitutional rights, the appellate court held that 
they had to be allowed to reapply under a new admissions 
program under which race was not a consideration.220 The 
court remanded the case to the district court to reconsider the 
issue of damages.221 
B. CONCLUSION 
The Fifth Circuit ultimately rejected the four justifications 
advanced by the Law School in support of the school's affinna-
tive action admissions program. First, and in direct conflict 
with Supreme Court precedent, the Fifth Circuit held that 
diversity is not a compelling governmental interest, and that 
the Law School may not use race as a factor in admissions 
decisions to achieve diversity.222 Second, the Hopwood court 
ruled that the Law School failed to demonstrate its admissions 
plan was remedial because the Law School provided insuffi-
cient evidence that it previously discriminated against minori-
ties.223 The Fifth Circuit held that the Law School's conten-
tion that it had a poor reputation among minority communities 
did not demonstrate past discrimination.224 Finally, the 
Hopwood court stated that perceptions of a hostile. environ-
ment do not justify the use of racial considerations in admit-
ting applicants.225 In this instance, the court noted that the 
use of race as a consideration may be particularly detrimental 
218. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 957. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. at 962. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. The Fifth Circuit went on to state that the University of Texas School 
of Law could not use race as a factor "to combat the perceived effects of a hostile 
environment at the law school, to alleviate the law school's poor reputation in the 
minority community; or to eliminate any present effects of past discrimination by 
actors other than the law school." Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962. 
223. See supra notes 76-77, 194-203 and accompanying text. 
224. See supra notes 204-211 and accompanying text. 
225. See supra notes 204-211 and accompanying text. 
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because such consideration facilitates racial hostility.226 
Therefore, because the Law School's use of race violated 
plaintiffs' constitutional rights, the Law School was ordered to 
allow the plaintiffs to reapply under a new non-racially based 
admissions program.227 Finally, the Fifth Circuit remanded 
the case to the district court on the issue of compensatory 
damages.228 
C. SPECIAL CONCURRENCE 
In a special concurring opinion, Judge Wiener agreed with 
the majority's final ruling, but stipulated that the court's opin-
ion should apply only to the case at bar.229 Judge Wiener also 
disagreed with the majority's analysis. 230 
1. Diversity 
While Judge Wiener agreed with the majority's final deci-
sion that the Law School's admissions plan was unconstitution-
al, he stated that the violation was due to insufficient narrow 
tailoring, not an impermissible governmental interest.231 
Judge Wiener disagreed with the majority's holding that diver-
sity in public education can never constitute a compelling in-
terest sufficient to withstand strict scrutiny.232 He stated that 
such a holding is in clear conflict with Bakke.233 Judge Wien-
er declared that if well-established Supreme Court precedent is 
to be overruled, it should be done by the Supreme Court, not 
the Fifth Circuit.2M Judge Wiener conceded that Bakke was 
the only opinion in which the Supreme Court declared diversi-
ty a compelling government interest.236 Judge Wiener stated 
however, that Justice Powell's singularity is precisely why he 
226. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 953. 
227. [d. at 962. 
228. [d. 
229. [d. 
230. [d. at 963-64. 
231. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962, 965-66. 
232. [d. . 
233. [d. at 963. 
234. [d. 
235. [d. at 964 n.18. 
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found Bakke the most relevant Supreme Court statement on 
the issue of diversity.236 In Judge Wiener's opinion, Justice 
Powell's sole comment on the issue, without contrary commen-
tary by a majority of the Court, further establishes Bakke as 
current law.237 Judge Wiener stated that if the issue of diver-
sity comes up before the Supreme Court the Justices will have 
no choice but to thoroughly examine Justice Powell's opinion in 
Bakke.238 Judge Wiener remarked that in holding that diver-
sity is not a compelling governmental interest, the majority's 
implication is that a remedial interest is the only interest 
deemed compelling.239 
2. Narrow Tailoring Insufficient 
Judge Wiener stated that the Fifth Circuit should not have 
invalidated the affirmative action plan based on an impermis-
sible government interest, but rather should have analyzed 
whether the means used by the Law School was narrowly 
tailored.240 Under a narrow tailoring test, Judge Wiener ar-
gued that the Law School's affirmative action admissions pro-
gram would have failed.241 He stated that African. Aniericans 
and Mexican Americans are only two ethnic groups out of 
many.242 Therefore, selecting only these two groups in grant-
ing special admissions treatment would not create classroom 
diversity.243 Consequently, the Law School's admissions pro-
gram resembled a quota system rather than a narrowly tai-
lored· program to establish genuine diversity.244 Moreover, 
Judge Wiener alleged that the diversity of which Justice 
Powell spoke in Bakke "encompasses a far broader array of 
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic 
origin is but a single though important element. "245 There-
fore, in scrutinizing the Law School's admission plan under 
236. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 964 n.18. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. at 964. 
240. Id. at 962. 




245. Id. at 965 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316). 
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Justice Powell's expansive concept of diversity, the affirmative 
action admissions program still falls short.246 
v. CRITIQUE 
The Fifth Circuit's opinion is flawed for several reasons. 
Not only did the Fifth Circuit exceed its limited role of appel-
late review by disregarding Supreme Court precedent,247 but 
it seriously undervalued the important role affirmative action 
plays in higher education. 
A. THE LIMITS OF FEDERAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
In holding that diversity is never a compelling governmen-
tal interest in higher education, the Fifth Circuit contradicts 
Supreme Court precedent established almost twenty years ago 
in Bakke.248 Such a ruling by a federal court of appeals ex-
ceeds the permissible scope of appellate jurisdiction.249 The 
U.S. Constitution proscribes that the ultimate judicial power of 
the United States resides in a single Supreme COurt.250 Pur-
suant to Title 28 of the United States Code Annotated Section 
2072(a), "The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe 
general rules of practice and procedure . . . for cases in the 
United States district courts and courts of appeals. "251 More-
over, Title 28 mandates that the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts of appeals is limited to final decisions rendered in lower 
246. Hopwood, 78 F.3d. at 966. Judge Wiener states: "[T]he law school created 
its own Catch-22 by advancing two putative compelling interests that ultimately 
proved to produce so much internal tension as to damage if not fatally wound 
each other. Under the banner of prior discrimination, Texas had no choice but to 
single out blacks and Mexican-Americans, for those two racial groups were the 
only ones of which there is any evidence whatsoever of defacto or dejure racial 
discrimination by the State of Texas in the history of its educational system. But, 
by favoring just those two groups and doing so with a virtual quota system for af-
firmative action in admissions, the law school estops itself from proving that its 
plan to achieve diversity is ingenuous, much less narrowly tailored." [d. at 966 
n.24. 
247. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993). 
248. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
249. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993). 
250. U.S. CONST. art. III, §1. 
251. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072(a) (West 1994). 
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federal district COurtS.252 In Hopwood however, the Fifth Cir-
cuit surpassed its authority by declaring diversity in the class-
room impermissible, in the absence of specific Supreme Court 
concurrence on that issue. Consequently, the ruling of the 
Fifth Circuit announcing that classroom diversity no longer 
constitutes a compelling governmental interest to satisfy strict 
scrutiny is erroneous and not binding.253 To obey the Fifth 
Circuit ruling in Hopwood would be to deny the law of the 
Supreme Court as the ultimate authority. 
Not only did the Fifth Circuit exceed the bounds of its 
jurisdiction, but it did so without adequate justification. In 
response to the district court's ruling and prior to the Fifth 
Circuit holding, the Law School abandoned the affirmative 
action admissions program in effect at the time the plaintiffs 
applied. 2M Moreover, as Judge Wiener noted in his concur-
ring opinion, the Fifth Circuit could have avoided contradicting 
the Bakke issue of diversity by holding that the Law School's 
admissions plan was not narrowly tailored.255 In striking 
down the Law School admissions plan on this basis, the Fifth 
Circuit would not have exceeded its permissible scope of juris-
diction. 
B. REMEDIAL ACTION ADDRESSED INSTEAD OF DIVERSITY 
Relying heavily on the holdings of Croson and Adarand, 
the Hopwood majority reasoned that diversity is never a com-
pelling governmental interest, but that discrimination for re-
medial purposes is permissible.256 However, neither Croson 
nor Adarand articulate this bright line conclusion, nor do these 
cases deal with diversity in higher education.257 
252. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993). 
253. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993). 
254. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 582, 582 n.87 (W.D. Tex. 1994). 
255. See supra notes 230, 239-245 and accompanying text. 
256. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (1996). 
257. See generally City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct 2097 (1996). 
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1. Croson 
In Croson, the majority addressed the dangers of racial 
classifications, the stigmatism attached to such classifica-
tions,258 and the need for strict scrutiny. 259 However, the 
Croson court focused on the governmental interest of remedial 
action in the employment context rather than diversity in 
higher education.260 The Court stated that it was skeptical of 
the City's claim that the purpose in enacting racial preferences 
in construction contracts was to remedy the effects of past dis-
crimination.261 The City failed to identify any specific dis-
crimination against minorities in the construction industry,262 
and the City's plan was based more on notions of societal dis-
crimination against African Americans than on particularized 
instances of discrimination.263 The Court held that remedial 
measures based solely on general societal discrimination is 
impermissible}S. Moreover, the Court found the City of 
Richmond's plan over inclusive since it randomly included all 
minority groups, many of whom may not have suffered dis-
crimination in Richmond.265 
Hopwood is similar to Croson in that the Law School ar-
gued its actions were remedial.266 However, the Law School 
also argued that its purpose in using race as a factor in admis-
sions decisions was to create classroom diversity,267 an inter-
est held to be compelling by the Supreme COurt.266 In fact, in 
Croson, Justice Stevens refused to limit the 'use of race solely 
258. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493. The majority states "Classifications based on race 
carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial 
settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to politics 
of racial hostility." 1d. 
259. 1d. 
260. 1d. at 511 (holding that remedial action is a permissible and compelling 
governmental interest in the context of employment). 
261. 1d. at 510-11. 
262. Croson, 488 U.S. at 510-11. 
263. 1d. 
264. 1d. at 505-06. 
265. 1d. at 506. 
266. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. 
267. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
268. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 561. 
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for the purpose of remedial action.269 In referencing recog-
nized compelling governmental interests aside from remedial 
action, Justice Stevens specifically cites to Justice Powell's 
opinion in Bakke.270 Therefore, Croson did not sufficiently 
support a finding that the Court would not continue to hold 
diversity as a compelling governmental interest. 
Moreover, the district court noted that in United States v. 
Fordice,271 the Supreme Court appeared to limit the rejection 
of societal discrimination for remedial action to the context of 
employment and not higher education.272 
2. Adarand 
In its application of Adarand, the Fifth Circuit appears to 
have focused more on the concurring opinions of Justices 
Thomas and Scalia, than on Justice O'Conner's majority opin-
ion.273 The Adarand Court overruled intermediate scrutiny as 
the proper level of review for racial classifications and an-
nounced that all racial classifications must withstand strict 
scrutiny.274 As in Croson, the Adarand Court focused on no-
tions of remedial action, rather than diversity.275 Neverthe-
less, although the Adarand Court questions the Bakke deci-
sion, it does not overrule it.276 This evidences the Supreme 
Court's choice to leave Bakke as binding precedent when pre-
sented with an opportunity to render Bakke invalid. 
The Hopwood court focused and relied primarily on claims 
of remedial state action in situations other than higher educa-
tion.277 This focus was too limited since the issue of diversity 
269. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 n.1, 511-12. 
270. [d. 
271. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992) . 
. 272. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 571. 
273. Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pens, 115 S. Ct 2097 (1992). 
274. [d. at 2112-13. 
275. Adarand Constructors Inc, v. Pens, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). 
276. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 96. The Court in Adarand states, "The [Supreme] 
Court's failure to produce a majority opinion in Bakke, Fullilove, and Wygant left 
unresolved the proper analysis for remedial race based governmental action." 
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 3002. 
277. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948-55. 
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was not wholly addressed in Croson and Adarand. Rather than 
dismiss diversity as impermissible, the Fifth Circuit should 
have focused on the role diversity plays in the classroom and 
whether the Law School's admissions program achieved diver-
sity. 
Until the Supreme Court takes a contrary position regard-
ing the compelling nature of diversity in higher education, 
Bakke is the law and classroom diversity is constitutionally 
permissible.278 Ironically, the Fifth Circuit states that to hold 
diversity as a constitutionally permissible goal would be to 
contradict the Supreme Court, which it admits it is "not autho-
rized to challenge. "279 
3. Importance of Diversity 
The Fifth Circuit severely underestimates the importance 
of diversity and the role it plays in the classroom.280 The Law 
School provided ample evidence to the district court as to the 
substantial benefits derived from a diverse student body.281 
In addition, several law school professors testified on behalf of 
the Law School concerning the positive impact diversity has on 
education, such as differing life experiences, overall outlook 
and varying perspectives on similar issues.282 The Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected this evidence and claimed that it was not color 
that furthers diverse viewpoints, but "individuals, with their 
own conceptions of life."283 The Fifth Circuit fails to acknowl-
edge however, that conceptions and perceptions come from 
different life experiences. Clearly a minority, simply by virtue 
of being a minority and enduring the daily struggles of life as a 
minority, will have a different conception of life than the white 
majority. 
The district court found that the Law School could not 
278. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
279. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945-46. 
280. [d. at 932. 
281. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 570-72. 
282. [d.· at 571. 
283. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 946. 
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obtain diversity without an affinnative action plan.284 More-
over, relying solely on the TI score, minorities in the Law 
School would be significantly underrepresented.285 As the tri-
al court noted, such a "meager representation" did not seem 
appropriate in a state school funded in part by all Texas resi-
dents.286 Consistent with these findings, the Fifth Circuit was 
therefore hasty in discounting diversity as. a compelling state 
interest. 
4. Evidence of Past Discrimination Satisfied 
As found by the district court in Hopwood, the state of 
Texas has a history of unequal educational opportunities for 
African Americans and Mexican Americans compared to educa-
tional opportunities for whites.287 The Fifth Circuit itself ac-
knowledged that Texas has a "history of racial discrimination 
in education."288 According to the findings of the district 
court, this. educational disparity is apparent as early as the 
primary and secondary schooling levels, and extends to higher 
education.289 As recently as 1989, a study indicated that the 
amount of spending allotted to San Antonio school children, 
with a large Hispanic school population, was $2,800 per 
child.290 In the neighboring predominately white town of Ala-
mo Heights however, the school system allotted each child 
$4,600.291 
The Fifth Circuit rejected arguments that discrimination 
284. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 571. 
285. [d. "Had the Law School ba8ed its 1992 admissions solely on the 
applicants' TI without regard to race or ethnicity, the entering class would have 
included, at most, nine blacks and eighteen Mexican Americans." [d. 
286. [d. at 571 n.60. 
287. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text. 
288. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 954. The Fifth Circuit stated "No one disputes that 
Texas has a history of racial discrimination in education." [d. Present effects in-
clude the fact that some minorities enrolled in the Law School feel isolated, are 
reluctant to participate in class discussions, and some continue to feel a hostile ra-
cial environment at the Law School. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 573. 
289. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text. 
290. JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES, 224 (1992); Oppenheimer, supra 
note 116, at 962. 
291. [d. 
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occurring at the primary and secondary levels was sufficient to 
justify a remedial plan or to establish diversity at the Law 
School. 292 Yet, the Law School takes residency into account 
when determining whether to admit an applicant.293 In order 
to obtain federal and state funding as a public institution, the 
Law School must accept a substantial majority of in-state ap-
plicants.294 
Statistical data indicates that African Americans, Mexican 
Americans, and other minorities residing in Texas receive 
substandard education as opposed to resident whites.295 It is 
difficult to see how this would not be relevant to the Law 
School's admittance process. Such substandard educational 
opportunities may have a domino effect. For example, inferior 
education will result in lower test scores and grades fO.r minori-
ties, which in turn may effect college admittance and/or lower 
academic achievement in college. As evidenced by Cheryl 
Hopwood's demotion from a presumptive admit to the discre-
tionary zone, the Law School does take into account the aca-
demic quality of the applicant's undergraduate college.296 
Therefore, it would appear that discrimination in Texas at 
the primary and secondary school levels is an important con-
sideration, at least where resident minority applicants are 
. competing for entrance with white resident applicants. Rather 
than completely abolish race as a consideration in admissions 
decisions, the Fifth Circuit could have adopted a far narrower 
approach by limiting racial considerations to minority Texas 
residents, whom the district court found receive inferior educa-
tional opportunities in Texas Schools. 
292. See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text. 
293. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 572. 
294. Id. The Fifth Circuit recognized the important role residency played in 
admitting applicants. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit majority stated "residency also 
had a strong, if not determinate effect [in admissions]. Under Texas law in 1992, 
the law school was limited to [accepting no more than] 15% non-residents." 
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935 n.2. 
295. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text. 
296. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 560. 
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Moreover, the Fifth Circuit erred in determining that the 
Law School failed to adequately prove discrimination within 
the University of Texas. The district court listed ample evi-
dence of the occurrence of past discrimination within the law 
school and the remaining effects of prior discrimination linger-
ing within the law school both in its reputation in the commu-
nity and in the perception of the Law School as a hostile envi-
ronment.297 
5. No Disadvantage 
It is difficult to see how the four plaintiffs in Hopwood 
were disadvantaged by the Law School's affirmative action 
admissions plan.29s The four plaintiffs were denied admission 
for reasons other than their race.299 For example, although 
Cheryl Hopwood had a high grade point average, she attended 
community colleges which the admissions committee deemed 
as non-competitive schools.3011 Moreover, Hopwood's applica-
tion contained no letters of recommendation, she failed to re-
spond to the application questions with any detail, she failed to 
describe her background or any unique skills she possessed, 
and she provided no personal statement with her applica-
tion.301 
Plaintiff Kenneth Elliott had a grade point average of 2.98, 
well below the mean grade point average of not only non-mi-
nority applicants, but also of minority applicants accepted 
under the affirmative action admissions plan~ 302 Plaintiff 
Douglas Carvell had a low LSAT score, and ranked only 98th 
297. See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text. 
298. See Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994). 
299. [d. at 580. 
300. [d. at 564. Hopwood subsequently testified that the reason she attended 
community colleges was "because she had to pay for her own education and had 
to work her way through school." Therefore, she could not afford to attend more 
prestigious schools. Hopwood did not provide this explanation in her application 
even though the application requested that such information be provided if the 
applicant "believe[d] [it] will help the Admissions Committee in evaluating [his or 
her] application. [d. at 564 nAO. 
301. [d. at 564. 
302. Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. at 565-66. See also the mean ranges of accepted 
applicants in Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 936-37, 937 n.7. 
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in his undergraduate class of 247.303 Furthermore, a letter of 
recommendation Carvell submitted to the Law School from a 
previous professor described Carvell's academic performance as 
"uneven, disappointing, and mediocre."304 Although Plaintiff 
David Rogers had a respectable grade point average, he 
flunked out of the University of Texas as an undergraduate. 
305Like Hopwood, Rogers provided no letters of recommenda-
tion.3°S Finally, plaintiffs' counsel conceded that they could 
not prove that each of the plaintiffs were denied admission as 
a result of the Law School's affirmative action plan.307 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The consequences of this decision are far reaching because 
of the binding effects on courts within the Fifth Circuit's juris-
diction, and because it stands out for other courts to see. AE. 
the district court stated in its opinion, affirmative action pro-
grams are needed in our society due to its "lengthy history of 
pervasive racism."308 The Fifth Circuit's decision clearly at-
tempts to undermine these needed aiflI'lllative action plans. 
It is likely however, that the Law School's admissions 
program would have failed the strict scrutiny test if. the Fifth 
Circuit had chosen to address this issue.309 AE. Judge Wiener 
surmised in his concurring opinion, many ininority communi-
ties exist which also contribute to diversity in the classroom 
aside from African Americans and Mexican Americans.310 The 
Law School did not satisfactorily prove that other minority 
groups were adequately represented at the Law School while 
African and Mexican Americans were underrepresented. There-
fore, it cannot stand to reason that the Law School's secondary 
admissions program was narrowly tailored to achieve true 
classroom diversity. 




307. Id. at 582 0.86. 
308. Hopwood, 861 F.3d at 583. 
309. See Hopwood, 861 F.3d at 551; see Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 968. 
310. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 968. 
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Unfortunately, the Hopwood court refused to discuss the 
issue of narrowly tailoring the affirmative action admissions 
plan and instead denounced diversity altogether as a permissi-
ble and compelling governmental interest sufficient to satisfy 
strict scrutiny. This seems to be a dramatic and unnecessary 
leap for a three judge appellate panel lacking the legal authori-
ty to render precedent law invalid. 
Emily V. Pastorius' 
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